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Introduction

rom 2001 through 2008 the United States experienced
a period of climate wars: politics vs. science, business
vs. government, and states vs. the federal government.
By early 2009 some of these conflicts started to move toward
resolution through legal action,
scientific advances, and shifts
in business strategies. Decisions made today will determine whether a new era of
climate protection begins or
the climate cold wars continue.
Business as usual is not in our
nation’s best interest and every
effort must be made to end the
period of continued infighting
between business and government, federal-state conflicts,
and denial of the root causes of
climate change. This paper reviews several of the climate wars
from 2001 to 2008, describes their historic context, and looks at
lessons learned for the future.

When candidate George H.W. Bush took office in 1988,
he declared: “Those who think we’re powerless to do anything
about the greenhouse effect are forgetting about the White House
effect. As President I intend to do something about it.”2 But President Bush may have underestimated the underlying economic
challenges. After EPA Administrator William Reilly briefed the
cabinet on climate change and
the prospect for an international
climate convention, he reported
to EPA officials3 what he had
heard at the briefing. Despite
growing agreement among climate modeling groups, White
House chief of staff John Sununu
declared that the climate models
were fundamentally flawed and
that the best atmospheric scientists had yet to become involved
in climate research. Office of Management and Budget director Richard Darman called the concept of a climate convention
“clean air for the whole world.” Council of Economic Advisors
(“CEA”) chairman Michael Boskin advised the president that an
international treaty on climate change was a “bet-your-economy
decision.”
Listening to the above advice would scare anyone worried
about destabilizing the U.S. economy. But, in the end, President
Bush supported the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (“IPCC”) as a way to address the division among
scientific viewpoints. Later he also supported the development
of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (“FCCC”)
that in turn led to the development of the Kyoto Protocol.
In the 1990s and during the Clinton Administration similar debates over science and economics continued. During the
subsequent Bush Administration (2001–2009) these debates
became more of a series of wars between politics vs. science,
business vs. government, and states vs. the federal government.

Decisions made today will
determine whether a new
era of climate protection
begins or the climate cold
wars continue.

Origin of the Climate Wars
For decades scientific uncertainty and the cost and regulatory approach of addressing global climate change have been at
the root of the climate debate. When in 1983 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) published a report evaluating
the effectiveness of specific energy policies to reduce greenhouse emissions (“Can We Delay a Greenhouse Warming?”),
responses from Congress, business, and federal agencies were
highly polarized.1 A sense of urgency among some Congressional leaders emerged in 1986. “Deeply disturbed” by the implications of published reports on carbon dioxide (“CO2”)-induced
climate change, Senators Chafee, Stafford, Bentsen, Durenberger, Mitchell, Baucus, Leahy, and Gore began to pressure the
White House to take action on climate change.
While the United States wavered on actions to address
climate change, the United Nations Environment Programme
(“UNEP”) was committed to initiating international and domestic actions to reduce greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions. UNEP
had a clear sense of purpose and in 1985 called for a legal convention on climate change and began to lead international scientific efforts to establish the foundation for negotiating such an
agreement. As discussed later, this effort had a major impact on
the U.S. climate debate.
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My review of several of the confrontations during this period
suggests a written or unwritten strategy aimed at:
• Avoiding new federal legislation and regulations. This
meant not allowing CO2 to be identified as a pollutant under
the Clean Air Act or as an endangerment to human health.
One approach used to prevent legislation was to emphasize
the uncertainty in the science of climate change.
• Doing nothing to hamper economic growth. The sluggish
economy didn’t need extra burdens on business. Instead,
federal actions promoted voluntary programs on climate
change, many of which have
helped to slow the growth of
greenhouse gases.
• Doing nothing until China,
India, and other developing
counties commit to reduce
GHG emissions. The United
States walked away from
both the intention of the 2002
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol largely based on economic considerations.
At the beginning of 2009,
many of the conflicts surrounding
climate change are moving toward
resolution and the time may be
at hand to resolve long-standing
conflicts over regulations and economic impacts and launch a
new era of energy-climate policy. While legitimate policy differences remain, as evidenced by different approaches advanced
by leading economists like Sir Nicholas Stern4 who argues for
immediate action on climate change and William Nordhaus who
proposes a modest and slower response,5 steps to resolve differences must be based on a different federal-business and federalstate-local government model. Business as usual is not in our
nation’s best interest.
This paper will examine several of the most significant
recent climate wars and their historic roots and suggested future
actions. Given the current economic recession, now more than
ever new government and business partnerships and close cooperation with non-government conservation, environmental, and
economic groups are needed to help the public understand the
economic and social costs of dealing with climate change, stimulate the economy, create a broader energy portfolio, mitigate
and adapt to climate change, and advance a new business and
foreign policy agenda.

Unfortunately, the campaign promise in 2000 was reversed in
March 2001 following an international conference among the
G-8 countries. The reversal, a surprise to the newly appointed
EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman, was a clear indication of behind-the-scene concerns about energy policy, economics, and government regulations.
At a meeting of the G-8 industrial countries in Trieste, Italy,
Governor Whitman announced that the United States was committed to regulation of GHG emissions. Whitman assured her
counterparts that the United States wanted a mandatory cap on
CO2 emissions. The Joint Communiqué expressed an international commitment to “take
the lead by strengthening and
implementing national programs and actions, to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, as
well as to promote and disseminate environmentally
sound technologies and practices and renewable energy
sources.” 7
Unfortunately, Administrator Whitman was unaware
of a behind-the-scenes effort
led by Senators Chuck Hagel,
Jesse Helms, Larry Craig, and
Pat Roberts to reverse this commitment. In a letter to the president, these senators made clear their view that the commitment
was unwise. The letter attracted the attention of Vice President
Cheney who, according to Barton Gellman, embarked on a plan
to “walk the president away from his promise.” 8 Cheney’s staff
prepared a four-page memo “that would put the White House
on record against the collective judgment of the world’s climate
scientists.” 9 The memo said Bush should be nudged toward the
position that the “current state of scientific knowledge about
causes of and solutions to global warming is inconclusive.
Therefore it would be premature at this time for the president
to propose any specific policy or approach aimed at addressing
global warming.” 10
The President accepted this approach and signed a letter
responding to the senators that was prepared by Cheney’s staff
and given to the President (by Cheney) without any consultation
across the government, especially with Governor Whitman. In a
White House press release the president said: “I do not believe,
however, that the government should impose on power plants
mandatory emissions reductions for carbon dioxide, which is not
a ‘pollutant’ under the Clean Air Act.” 11
Chief of Staff Josh Bolten ultimately assumed responsibility for the president’s reversal, asserting that he had been
in error: the intended designation for CO2 was “emission” not
“pollutant.” 12 Underlying such a distinction was fear of establishing a legal basis for regulating CO2. After Bolten’s admission, Vice President Dick Cheney agreed, arguing that putting a
cap on CO2 “was bad energy policy.” 13

Underlying the opposition
to CO2 regulation was
the critical issue of the
supposed economic
impacts that would result
from regulating CO2 and
who would pay for it.

Resisting GHG Regulations:
The 2001 G-8 Meeting
During the 2000 presidential campaign, candidate George
W. Bush promoted legislation to “require the mandatory reduction in U.S. of emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide,
mercury and carbon dioxide from power plants.” 6 Many observers saw this as a significant departure from past history and
were optimistic that a new era of climate change would begin.
5
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Underlying the opposition to CO2 regulation was the critical issue of the supposed economic impacts that would result
from regulating CO2 and who would pay for it. The Bush administration’s priority for economic growth was clearly evident in
all policy actions. A key chapter of the Economic Report of the
President submitted to Congress in 2002 focused on the cost of
environmental regulations. Recognizing the significant achievement of the past decades in reducing the most obvious risks
to health and the environment, the report states, “there is evidence that further improvements in air quality would improve
health and reduce mortality, but these improvements might be
extremely expensive.” 14
Risk and cost-benefits analyses were key factors driving
public policy in 2001 through 2008. Regulating emissions that
affect climate change was recognized as potentially very valuable but not as an immediate priority in light of the cost and
questions about the potential risks. “We are uncertain about
the effect of natural fluctuations on global warming. We do not
know how much the climate could or will change in the future.
We do not know how fast climate change will occur, or even
how some of our actions could affect it. Finally, it is difficult
to say with any certainty what constitutes a dangerous level of
warming that must be avoided.” 15
Fearing the economic impact of any climate legislation,
promoting scientific uncertainty and denying global warming
became the operating plan for many business and government
leaders.

Promoting Scientific Uncertainty:
Challenging the 2001 and 2007
IPCC Assessments
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”)
has become the world’s preeminent scientific body assessing
the impacts of and proposing options for responding to climate
change. A key element of its 2001 assessment was its statement
on the growing evidence for human-induced climate change.16
And one specific diagram—later termed the “hockey stick”—
was ultimately to cause considerable angst among policy makers. What is the IPCC? What are its assessments? And how does
this relate to domestic energy policy?
In 1985 UNEP, in cooperation with other international
organizations and non-government organizations, organized a
conference and prepared a scientific assessment of the impacts
of climate change.17 UNEP Executive Director Moustafa Tolba
sent the report to then Secretary of State George Schultz urging
the United States to take appropriate policy actions on climate
change and to launch negotiations on a climate convention. The
State Department passed the letter to the National Climate Program Office (“NCPO”) and its senior interagency policy board
to draft a response. (The NCPO, created within NOAA by Congress as a coordinating body among all federal agencies, was
mandated to develop a climate action plan. From 1982 to 1989 I
was the director of NCPO, which was later replaced by the interagency Global Change Research Program.)
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The NCPO policy board, which included all relevant federal agencies, vigorously debated the merit of the report. The
U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) representative argued that
it was inadequate, in part because it had no government sanction. DOE vocally insisted on a government-led international
scientific assessment. At the same time, EPA and the Department of State representatives supported the idea of a convention
on climate change and suggested that perhaps it was timely for
governments to prepare an international scientific assessment,
especially in light of conflicting scientific evidence. During the
debate, I offered a consensus proposal where the United States
would support an international government-led scientific assessment and would agree to international negotiations if the seriousness of the problem were affirmed. For different reasons, each
agency agreed to the proposal. At a time when it was difficult to
get interagency agreement on any action, there was agreement
around the concept of an international scientific assessment.
The action of the NCPO Policy Board eventually led to the
U.S. proposal for “an intergovernmental mechanism” to conduct
a government-led, scientific assessment of the climate change
issue.18 This “mechanism” later became the IPCC, which continues today as the preeminent global scientific court on climate
change. In the end, the IPCC report confirmed the seriousness of
the climate problem and triggered the beginning of negotiations
for a climate convention.
Back to the climate wars—because of their relevance to
policy, the 2001 and 2007 scientific assessments came under
intense scrutiny. One figure in the 2001 report triggered particularly intense reaction. This report drew on data from a 1998
publication by Michael Mann, Raymond Bradley, and Malcolm
Hughes that reconstructed temperature patterns over the past
1000 years (“MBH98”).19 The controversial graph depicted a
sharp rise in temperatures over the past 100 years, which the
authors attributed to human activity. The graph, with its “hockey
stick” pattern, was a key piece of supporting evidence in the
2001 IPCC report.
Mann, who has been an author of the IPCC report, testified before Congress in 2003 that: “It is the consensus of the climate research community that the anomalous warmth of the late
20th century cannot be explained by natural factors, but instead
indicates significant anthropogenic, that is human influences.” 20
Nevertheless the underlying scientific methods used by MBH98
were criticized by other authors who challenged the evidence
that the sharp rise in global temperature was being caused by
human activities.21
The hockey stick became an element of the climate war
when, in June 2003, Representative Joe Barton of Texas, the
Republican chairman of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, requested that Mann provide responses to eight detailed
questions related to his credentials and past work.22 The Subcommittee ultimately asked the National Academy of Science
(“NAS”) to review the issue, and NAS formed a committee of
twelve scientists to assess the main areas of uncertainty, the principal methodologies used, any problems with these approaches,
and how central the debate is to the state of scientific knowledge
6

on global climate change. In the end, the NAS report agreed that
there were statistical shortcomings in the analysis but concluded
that the conclusions were in fact correct.
Considering that the essence of the scientific process is peer
review and reproduction of results, why was this an issue for a
Congressional oversight subcommittee? Who or what was the
real focus of this debate? Two objectives seemed to underlie this
debate: to dispute any claim of human-induced climate change
and hence any need for legislation; and to challenge the IPCC
process and its current and future credibility by showing it relied
on publishing flawed papers.
In 2001, the IPCC assessment scientists concluded that it
was “likely” (which it defined as with a greater than sixty-six
percent probability) that climate change was caused by human
activities.23 Six years later, the 2007 report raised the probability
of human influences on climate to “very likely” (indicating a
probability greater than ninety percent) and detectable in observational records.24 This stronger conclusion reflected a great
deal of scientific progress made over the intervening years, both
in direct observations of the impacts of climate change, and in
computer modeling. Nearly all scientists have concluded that
current trends could not be explained without including humanrelated increases in greenhouse gases. While the 2007 report
strengthened the consensus among most scientists and governments, a number of critics argue either that the report was too
conservative or too alarming.
Using scientific uncertainty to undermine support for climate legislation was further advanced by reliance on an obscure
law known as the Federal Data Quality Act (“FDQA”).

Regulating Science by Lawsuits on
Data Quality
FDQA, a little-known rider to the 2001 Consolidated Appropriations Act, directed the director of the Office of Management
and Budget (“OMB”) to issue government-wide guidelines that
“provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal agencies
for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility,
and integrity of information (including statistical information)
disseminated by Federal agencies.” 25 The law requires that any
scientific document issued by the government include clearly
supportable data and any uncertainties related to the topic. It was
approved without any congressional hearings. Many businesses
supported the Act as a means to reign in regulation perceived to
be unsupported by science. Environmentalists criticized its passage and predicted it would be used to stop regulations aimed at
protecting public health and the environment.
The first lawsuit to be filed under the FDQA asked the government to cease dissemination of the 2000 U.S. National Assessment of the Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and
Change. The 2003 suit filed by the Competitive Enterprise Institute (“CEI”) against President Bush asked the federal courts to
order the White House Office of Science Technology and Policy
(“OSTP”) to withdraw the assessment report. The suit asserted
that data in the Assessment was derived from “demonstrably
inaccurate computer models, and dissemination of historical
7

temperature data that it modified to inaccurately omit the occurrence of recognized climatic periods. This Act prohibits Defendant from disseminating data failing to meet its standards.” 26
The CEI claimed that the assessment failed to meet the DQA’s
scientific standards for objectivity and utility, because two of the
models used “are incapable of providing reliable predictions.” 27
Understanding this morass requires some history. In 1990,
Congress enacted the Global Change Research Act that required
the preparation of national climate assessments.28 The Act
established the United States Global Change Research Program
with the aim of understanding and responding to global change,
including the cumulative effects of human activities and natural
processes on the environment, to promote discussions toward
international protocols in global change research, and for other
purposes. The Act requires “on a periodic basis (not less frequently than every 4 years)” the preparation of an assessment
report to the President and Congress that among other things
“analyzes the effects of global change on the natural environment, agriculture, energy production and use, land and water
resources, transportation, human health and welfare, human
social systems, and biological diversity,” and “analyzes current
trends in global change, both human-induced and natural, and
projects major trends for the subsequent 25 to 100 years.” 29
The National Assessment Synthesis Team (“NAST”) a
federal advisory committee, consisting of experts from government, universities, industry, and non-governmental organizations prepared the first of these assessments completing it in late
2000. Using results from two different climate models, the team
developed two different but plausible scenarios of future climate
change and evaluated their environmental impacts.
Considering the potential impact of climate change on the
United States, NAST leader Michael MacCracken’s staff sent
the report to every state governor. Ironic as it may be, then Texas
Governor George Bush responded, “Thank you for your letter
and the enclosed copies of your assessment about the potential
consequences to the U.S. of a climate change. I appreciate the
work that went into preparing this information.” 30
The 2000 Assessment Report, completed before the enactment of the FDQA, became the foundation for the U.S. annual
report to the UN on climate change required under the 2002
UNFCCC. The third U.S. report in 2002, based on the 2000
assessment report, concluded: “Greenhouse gases are accumulating in Earth’s atmosphere as a result of human activities,
causing global mean temperature and subsurface ocean temperatures to rise. While the changes observed over the last several
decades are likely due mostly to human activities, we cannot
rule out that some significant part is also a reflection of natural
variability.” 31
This conclusion, which seemed at odds with federal policy,
prompted The New York Times science writer Andrew Revkin to
report (June 3, 2002) “[i]n a stark shift for the Bush administration, the United States has sent a climate report to the United
Nations detailing specific and far-reaching effects that it says
global warming will inflict on the American environment. In the
report, the administration for the first time mostly blames human
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

actions for recent global warming. It says the main culprit is the
burning of fossil fuels that send heat-trapping greenhouse gases
into the atmosphere.” 32
Perhaps recognizing that the U.S. Report to the UN interpreted in this manner was setting a foundation for possible future
regulatory action, President Bush dismissed the U.S. report by
saying it had been put “out by
the bureaucracy.” 33 Recognizing the potential legal implications of the U.S Report, the
rationale for the CEI lawsuit
becomes clearer. On August
6, 2003, CEI filed a lawsuit
against the Administration to
invalidate the 2000 National
Assessment of the Potential
Consequences of Climate Variability and Change that formed
the basis for many of the conclusions in the Climate Action
Report.
Amid Congressional investigations of possible White
House promotion of the initiation of the lawsuit, the lawsuit
was ultimately withdrawn after the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (“OSTP”) acknowledged that the
National Assessment on Climate Change had not been subjected
to the FDQA guidelines.
The use of the FDQA as a tool in the war on science is not
over. In August 2008 the U.S. Chamber of Commerce asked the
government to withdraw the Second National Climate Report
that argued that it is “likely that there has been a substantial
human contribution to surface temperature increases in North
America.” 34 The Chamber argued that the report contained
unpublished data that made it difficult to assess its scientific reliability. The Bush Administration settled the dispute by inserting
a disclaimer that the National Report was not subject to FDQA
guidelines.
The war on science is likely to continue, but specific actions
could go a long way toward restoring the independence and
integrity of scientific assessment by rescinding the FDQA and
any executive orders that provide political oversight of science,
such as the controversial Executive Order 13422, which requires
that “[f]ederal agencies should promulgate only such regulations as are required by law, are necessary to interpret the law,
or are made necessary by compelling public need, such as material failures of private markets to protect or improve the health
and safety of the public, the environment, or the well-being of
the American people. In deciding whether and how to regulate,
agencies should assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating.” On
February 4, 2009, President Obama repealed EO 13422.35
Peer review—not lawsuits—is the underlying framework
for evaluating science. This traditional process allows critical
examination of new ideas and theories and forces scientists to

defend their work. One critical element of peer review needed
for policy makers is estimating scientific uncertainty. Translating science into policy is well illustrated by the IPCC. While
the IPCC reports are designed to reflect scientific consensus, an
IPCC policy summary is a document prepared for policy makers. Reflecting governments’ concerns, the IPCC process was
designed to allow governments
to review and approve a summary for policy makers while
being faithful to the underlying
science. Although a good deal of
climate change science is fundamental physics, a large portion
of the impacts of climate change
reflects modeling that may
include uncertainties in extent
and timing.
Although the negotiations
and approval of the policy summaries by governments can be
torturous, the IPCC process has
been successful in both preserving integrity and forging consensus among governments and scientists. This process underscores
that there is some discretion in how scientists and policy makers
can communicate the significance and the need for action. The
situation was less clear in 2003 when EPA was finalizing its first
Draft Report on the Environment (“RoE ”).

The war on science is
likely to continue,
but specific actions could
go a long way toward
restoring the independence
and integrity of
scientific assessment.
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Editing EPA’s 2006 Draft Report on
the Environment
The EPA RoE, launched in 2001 by Governor Whitman
aimed to give the public a snapshot of the quality of the U.S.
environment and to establish a set of indicators or metrics to
measure improvements (or declines) over time. One contentious
issue was the chapter on climate change. Initially, the Chairman
of the White House Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”)
argued that such a chapter was not needed since so many other
climate reports were available. It was later recognized that an
EPA RoE without a chapter on climate change would not be
credible.
The interagency review of the chapter on climate change
was heated. (From October 2002 to June 2003 while on detail
as CEQ Associate Director for Sustainable Development, I was
given the task of helping resolve interagency disagreements.)
Flagging the chapter’s section on climate change, White House
staff noted: “This section should be thoroughly reviewed for
content and usefulness of that content. The section ‘What are
the contributions to climate change . . .’ is not balanced and
virtually ignores any mention of natural variability . . . . If this
cannot be balanced, it needs to be removed.” Office of Management and Budget staff commented to CEQ Chief of Staff Philip
Cooney on March 4, 2003, “Phil, I don’t know whether you have
reviewed the Climate Section of the EPA report, but I think you
and Jim [Connaughton] need to focus on it before it goes final.
8

Even though the information is generally not new, I suspect this
will generate negative press coverage.” 36
While the review was underway, CEQ’s chief of staff was
promoting a new paper by Willie Soon and Sally Baliunas that
contradicted published accounts of historic climate trends. The
Soon-Baliunas paper asserted that it was an authoritative review
of the literature and concluded: “that the 20th century is probably not the warmest nor a uniquely extreme climatic period of
the last millennium.” 37 Shortly thereafter, thirteen of the authors
of papers cited by Soon and Baliunas refuted the Soon-Baliunas interpretation of their work and contradicted “thousands of
papers that go into a document like the IPCC report.” 38
Four versions of the RoE climate change chapter went back
and forth between CEQ and EPA, which was finally instructed
to take the changes or leave it. On May 23, 2003, after several
days of internal EPA discussions, EPA Administrator Whitman yanked the chapter from the report. This war is one of several described in the House Oversight Committee’s review of
science editing. Two years later on June 8, 2005, a similar incident of heavy CEQ editing of a NOAA report was described in
The New York Times. On March 19, 2007, Chairman Connaughton and Chief of Staff Cooney of CEQ testified before Congress
and defended their editing as necessary to make the final report
consistent with published literature. The hearing highlighted the
role of policy-makers distorting or asserting their own interpretation of scientific results. In the IPCC policy-makers summary
that governments negotiate, all scientists must agree with the
changes thus preventing any government from distorting the
results.
The hearing failed to invite the one key witness whose
judgment ultimately decided the fate of the report. In the end it
was the EPA administrator (and former Republican governor of
New Jersey) who decided that the revised chapter should not be
included. Administrator Whitman said in effect that the chapter—as edited—would diminish EPA’s credibility as an environmental agency. EPA staff advised Whitman that the benefits
of removing the chapter “were that it would provide little content for attacks on EPA’s science and that it may be the only way
to meet White House and EPA needs.” 39

States vs. Federal Government:
A Supreme Court Decision
In 1999 the International Center for Technology Assessment, the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, and other environmental
groups petitioned the EPA to regulate and set limits for CO2 and
other GHGs emitted from new motor vehicles, arguing that such
action was EPA’s duty under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act.
The petitioning groups’ central argument was that CO2 was a
pollutant and that its impact on global warming was negatively
affecting human health and the environment. EPA failed to
respond to the petition within three years, leading to a lawsuit
brought by the environmental groups in 2002.40
Subsequently, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maine filed
a petition in June 2003 arguing that by failing to regulate CO2
EPA was violating its mandatory duty under Section 108 of the
9

Clean Air Act. EPA denied the petition arguing that the Clean
Air Act did not authorize the agency to issue mandatory regulations to address global warming, and that even if the EPA did
have such authority, the agency believed it would be neither
“effective or appropriate” to establish GHG emissions standards
for motor vehicles at this time.41
After EPA denied the petition to regulate CO2, a coalition
of twelve states led by Massachusetts; the cities of New York,
Washington, DC, and Baltimore; and thirteen environmental
groups filed appeals in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in October 2003.42 The three-judge panel
faced three issues: the standing of the petitioners, EPA’s authority to regulate GHG emissions, and the agency’s decision not to
establish GHG standards for new vehicles. On July 15, 2005, the
court of appeals issued three opinions in the case. Two of the
judges agreed, although on differing grounds, to let stand EPA’s
position that it lacked the requisite authority. However Judge
David Tatel issued a lengthy dissent, agreeing with the Massachusetts position on all grounds. Following the petitioners’
request, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari directing the Appeals Court to forward the case record for its review;
The Supreme Court heard arguments on November 29, 2006.
Two important criteria are required to have standing to sue
the federal government: that at least one petitioner must be able
to show injury from an actual or imminent action traceable to a
federal agency and that the injury is one that a court can address.43
Hence the real underlying issue was whether the impacts of climate change on a state serve as justification for a suit in federal
court. A positive finding on this question would mean any state
could petition the federal government for national action.44
The Supreme Court decision affirmed that, “The harms associated with climate change are serious and well recognized.” 45
Massachusetts declared that its harm includes prospective loss
of coastline that would be caused by the rise in sea level resulting from global warming. Because EPA “does not dispute the
existence of a causal connection between man-made gas emissions and global warming,” and “EPA’s refusal to regulate such
emissions ‘contributes’ to Massachusetts’ injuries,” the Plaintiffs satisfied the traceability requirements.46
Writing for the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens summarized three important holdings: (1) As quasi-sovereigns, states
are entitled to an elevated level of deference on standing issues;
(2) CO2 and other GHGs are “air pollutants”; and (3) EPA’s
reasons for not regulating GHG emissions were insufficient.47
Four justices dissented (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito),
arguing that states did not have any special rights of status and
that nothing the Court could do would address the injuries complained of because “any decrease in emissions here will be overwhelmed many times over by emissions increases elsewhere in
the world.” 48
In his assessment, Justice Stevens quoted climate scientist
Michael MacCraken who argued that the harms associated with
climate change are serious and well recognized. Also citing a
National Research Council assessment, which EPA itself regards
as an “objective and independent assessment of the relevant
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

science,” a number of environmental changes that have already
inflicted significant harms were identified, including:
. . . the global retreat of mountain glaciers, reduction in
snow-cover extent, the earlier spring melting of rivers
and lakes, [and] the accelerated rate of rise of sea levels
during the 20th century relative to the past few thousand years [and] petitioners allege that this only hints
at the environmental damage yet to come. According
to the climate scientist MacCracken, “qualified scientific experts involved in climate change research” have
reached a “strong consensus” that global warming
threatens (among other things) a precipitate rise in sea
levels by the end of the century, and severe and irreversible changes to natural ecosystems.49
The Court’s decision changed the legal and political landscape. President Bush issued an Executive Order in May 2007
that directed EPA and the Departments of Transportation,
Energy, and Agriculture to coordinate in developing possible
regulatory actions to address emissions from mobile sources
contributing to global climate change.50 This is a complicated
process requiring that the EPA assert that the carbon emissions
endanger public health and welfare under the Clean Air Act.
While it might seem that this federal-state battle is over, that
is not the case. Battles between federal agencies, again reflecting economic concerns, were clearly evident in an agency public comment on the proposed greenhouse gas rulemaking under
the Clean Air Act. Comments received from the Secretaries of
Energy, Agriculture, Commerce, and Transportation—underscoring economic concerns—noted:
The EPA staff now has prepared a draft suggesting the
Clean Air Act can be both workable and effective for
addressing global climate change by regulating emissions from stationary and mobile sources of virtually
every kind. Our agencies have serious concerns with
this suggestion because it does not fairly recognize the
enormous—and we believe insurmountable—burdens,
difficulties and costs and likely limited benefits of using
the Clean Air Act to regulate GHG emissions.51
Consequently OMB advised EPA Administrator Johnson
that: “The issues raised during interagency review are so significant that we have been unable to reach interagency consensus
in a timely way, and as a result, this draft cannot be considered
Administration policy.” 52 EPA action to implement the Supreme
Court decision has been deferred to the new Administration.53

Resolving the Climate War
The climate wars of the past decades between business and
government and between federal and state governments have
inhibited the convergence of four critical factors needed to
address climate change: (1) advances in science and technology;
(2) effective application of government regulations and policies;
(3) adoption of green business practices; and (4) new foreign
policy initiatives. Overcoming these conflicts requires a different government and business approach. Federal interactions with
business should include GHG regulations, market incentives,
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and collaborative programs; cooperation with state and local
governments should focus on promoting alternate energy systems and mitigation and adaptation to climate change; and new
foreign policies should highlight the need for an energy-climate
economy, especially with China.
The use of science as a tool in fueling the climate wars must
end. Scientific consensus on human-induced climate change is
now stronger than ever and efforts to undermine, edit, or otherwise discredit scientific reports should end. The focus should
be on the value of science in helping decision-makers make the
right decisions. Now more than ever the interface of physical
and behavior science and economics will be needed to rebuild
the economy and move society toward more sustainable energy
systems. Anticipating the importance of this goal, the 1998
House Committee on Science argued in the report Unlocking
Our Future:
While acknowledging the continuing need for science
and engineering in national security, health, and the
economy, the challenges we face today cause us to propose that the scientific and engineering enterprise ought
to move towards center stage in a fourth role: that of
helping society make good decisions. We believe this
role for science will take on increasing importance,
particularly as we face difficult decisions related to the
environment.54
Preparing for the presidential election in 2008, dozens of
organizations prepared hundreds of recommendations for action
by the new Administration. Overall all of these actions should be
judged on how well they advance a consensus among business
and government and end the climate wars of the past decades.
Three strategic directions for future actions stand out and are
detailed below.

New Business and Government Approaches on
Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Effective national climate regulations and policies are needed
to mitigate GHG emissions. A key challenge for the new
administration will be to launch a new era of governmentindustry partnerships.
Historically, industry has met every new proposed environmental or health regulation with declarations of impending economic disaster. In remarks following EPA’s creation in 1970 the
director of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce warned of the potential collapse of entire industries from pollution regulations.55
Given the current economic crisis in the auto sector, it is ironic to
recall Lee Iacocca’s 1972 prediction (quoted by Thomas Friedman) that, “If EPA does not suspend the catalytic converter rule,
it will cause Ford to shut down and would result in reduction of
GDP by $17 billion, increase unemployment by 800,000, and
decrease tax receipts of $5 billion all levels of government.” 56
U.S. electric utilities claimed that the cost of meeting the 1990
Clean Air Act would reach $4–5 billion per year. But by 1996,
utilities were actually saving $150 million per year due to the
act. When EPA announced a phase-out of substances that damage the ozone layer, many industries claimed that alternative
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substances did not exist or were too expensive. In 1993, automobile manufacturers warned that regulation of chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCs”) would increase the price of new cars by up to
$1,200. Just four years later, the industry admitted that costs of
following the new rules had declined to as little as $40.57 More
recently, studies by Roland Hwang and Matt Peak (as quoted by
Thomas Friedman) “found that the target industries dramatically
and consistently overestimate the costs that regulations would
impose on them and dramatically underestimate the innovation
they would inspire.” 58
In all of these cases the costs of complying with environmental regulations were far lower than industry—and even
government—estimated that they would be. More recently a
second perspective on regulations has emerged emphasizing
potential economic advantages. General Electric’s (“GE’s”)
2005 “ecomagination” initiative launched the notion that “green
is green.” 59 The GE initiative is part of a broader greening of
industry as demonstrated by interviews with dozens of key
industrial leaders60 and a convergence of government and business policies moving toward more sustainable behavior.61 For
example, GE is one of a number of large companies that for the
first time are energetically advocating national legislation to
address GHG emissions.62
The formation of the U.S. Climate Action Partnership
(“USCAP”) and its proposal for GHG controls further illustrate the change of some company attitudes. USCAP members include dozens of the world’s largest companies who now
argue for a mandatory cap-and-trade program and market based
incentives.63
Broader support from industry for the USCAP’s business
approach will depend on exactly how GHG regulations are formulated and implemented. Many companies will want credit for
their past carbon-reducing actions, many others will be looking
for incentives before moving forward and many will want equitable economic impacts across all business sectors. USCAP’s
member support for mandatory approaches to GHG reduction is
at odds with historic business models. Smart business strategies
will be needed to achieve that goal.
The costs of GHG reductions—and who will bear them—
have always been a concern for policy makers. In 2002, the Bush
administration saw an economy with a meager 1.6% growth rate
in GDP as the nation struggled to recover from bursting of the
high tech bubble and the 9/11 attacks. Even by 2007 the U.S.
GDP growth rate was only 2.2%. In response to declining housing markets, GDP growth projections of just 1.9% per year prevailed in 2007. Today in 2009, with the U.S. and international
economies adjusting to financial collapse in many financial sectors, any scheme for taxing or capping carbon emissions will
need to include energy-economic models such as those envisioned by green business advocates. But despite a significant
downturn in the economy, the time is right to launch a new era
of government-business cooperation whereby GHG regulations
and green energy initiatives both stimulate the economy while
reducing GHG emissions, and protect human health and ecosystems for ecological services.
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The new government-business strategy must include
advancing new technologies, setting carbon limits, facilitating implementation of other new regulations, and creating
new incentives for industry. Corporations must put aside tired
refrains of resisting federal regulations as inherently anti-business. Strong federal support to regulate existing GHG emissions
and to support Research & Development on new technologies
to reduce GHG emissions is essential. Incentives to do both can
enhance economic competitiveness and protect the environment. Both government and business must see the role of environmental regulations in a new light recognizing the fallacies of
past actions. Both government and business, with support from
non-government organizations and the public, must agree on the
sense of urgency and work together to implement a new business strategy.
Given today’s economic downturn, former CEA chair
Michael Boskin’s comment (cited earlier) that an international
treaty on climate change was a “bet-your-economy decision”
might in fact be right if viewed as a step toward economic recovery and the launching of a new era of a green economy.

Federal-State Cooperation on Reducing GHG and
Adapting to Climate Change
States and cities have been in the lead in developing policies
to reduce GHG. Past federal-state conflicts need to end and
new partnerships developed.
Worldwide power generation is the largest GHG emitter
generating nearly 10 billion tons of CO2 per year.64 With over
8,000 power plants (out of more than 50,000 globally), the U.S.
accounts for about 2.8 billion tons of CO2 annually—about
25% of worldwide emissions.65 The U.S. power plants that
produce the most CO2 are all coal-fired and are located in the
states with the largest GHG emissions (including the top five of
Texas, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana).66 These states
(and many others), through the use of renewable portfolio standards (“RPS”), are on the front lines in efforts to reduce GHG
emissions.
Around the country many states are requiring utilities to
provide specific amounts of power from renewable energy
sources. Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia established RPSs by mid-2007.67 By the same time, forty-seven states
were engaged in state or regional energy planning, forty-one
had established standards to allow rooftop solar systems and
other distributed-generation technology to connect to the electric grid, ten had created energy-efficiency portfolio standards,
and sixteen had implemented public benefit funds to support
clean energy programs.68 According to a Pew Center review of
state RPS programs, while these standards range from modest
to ambitious, “the use of renewable energy does deliver significant GHG reductions. For instance, Texas is expected to
avoid 3.3 million tons of CO2 emissions annually with its RPS,
which requires 2000 megawatts of new renewable generation by
2009. Increasing a state’s use of renewable energy brings other
benefits as well, including job creation, energy security, and
cleaner air.” 69
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Public and investor support for renewable energy is growing
as is evident by the 2007 $32 billion buyout of the Texas power
company TXU Corp. by private equity firms Kohlberg Kravis
Roberts & Co. (“KKR”) and the Texas Pacific Group. TXU had
been battling environmentalists and others who had been working to prevent the company from
more than doubling its fleet of
coal-fired power plants in Texas.
Opponents to the expansion
claimed the new plants would
drastically increase emissions of
sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides,
mercury, and carbon dioxide.
As part of their plan to purchase
Texas electricity provider TXU
Corp., Texas Pacific Group and
KKR have agreed to terminate
the applications for eight of
TXU’s eleven proposed coal
plants in Texas and will adopt a
platform of initiatives that will
significantly reduce the company’s environmental impact in
Texas.70
A short time after the TXU buyout, Kansas became the first
state to reject a coal-fired power plant solely because of potential impacts of climate change. Since then, the state has become
ground zero for a nationwide battle pitting environmental concerns against powerful economic and political interests. Kansas
now faces legal actions to reverse this decision.71
Initiation of RPS programs is not the only way that states are
seeking to reduce GHG emissions and expand economic development. Many states have petitioned the federal government for
action on transportation fuel standards. On the basis of federal
Clean Air Act provisions that allow California, subject to EPA
approval, to set anti-pollution standards stricter than those of the
federal government, the state petitioned EPA for a Clean Air Act
waiver so that it could require stricter automobile regulations for
carbon emissions. In December 2007, after the passage of federal legislation establishing national automotive fuel efficiency
at 35 mpg, EPA denied the California petition.72 California and
other states plan to appeal the EPA decision; more legal battles
are likely in 2009 and beyond.
Other actions by California underscore the business side
of GHG reductions. Because of its early commitment to energy
efficiency and renewable energy, California expected to develop
nearly 95,600 new jobs and $21 billion in investment to manufacture the components of renewable energy systems.73 While
such forecasts may be delayed by the current economic crises,
they are nonetheless inevitable as the economy rebounds. Cities (in the United States and around the world) are also leading
efforts to reduce GHG emissions. Members of the C-40 group
of the world’s largest cities are committed to tackling climate
change and have committed to investing over $1 billion to
finance energy-saving measures in municipal buildings.74

Looking ahead, federal-state cooperation must build on two
key factors: (1) passing appropriate legislation and policies to
coordinate and reduce GHG emission and (2) developing strategies needed to adapt to climate change. These city and state
actions highlight shifting environmental and economic base that
is pushing the United States
toward “a de facto national
RPS through a tapestry of
state-based programs.” 75
These state actions are challenging the federal government to find constructive and
supportive ways to help. It is
therefore not surprising that
the bipartisan Presidential
Climate Action Project has
recommended the creation
of “a federal-state partnership with $1 billion annual in
grants to states and communities to implement climate
action plans, reform utility
rates to encourage energy efficiency, and adapt to climate
76
change. Anticipating the need for federal-state cooperation, a
new think tank has been launched at Georgetown University’s
Law Center to develop policies and positions and recommendations related to state-federal issues.
Federal-state partnerships must also focus on giving state
and local leaders the information they need to anticipate and
adapt to impacts of climate change. A better understanding
of regional and local impacts of climate change is critical for
effective decision-making. Given the projected IPCC business
as usual scenarios for CO2 emissions and recognizing how long
it might take to implement new mitigation strategies to reduce
GHG emissions, adaptation may be the most immediate need to
avoid potential serious impacts. Recognizing this, the National
Research Council (“NRC”) in 2007 evaluated the many federal
climate assessments and emphasized the need for better understanding of local impacts, better communication of scientific
results, and more focus on social science issues.77
These are important conclusions and should impact the
scope and direction of federal research programs. As the NRC
evaluation noted, “only $25 million to $30 million of CCSP’s
[U.S. Climate Change Science Program] $1.7 billion annual
budget is devoted to such research.” 78 “In addition, few social
scientists are in leadership positions at the participating federal
agencies, making it difficult for CCSP to increase emphasis in
this area or to establish links with the academic social science
community.” 79
The NRC report recognized the importance of communicating scientific results to decision makers and urged a closer
examination of the impact of climate change at regional and
local scales.80 “More accurate models, better regional observations, and the development of impact scenarios will be required

Federal-state cooperation
must build on two key
factors: passing appropriate
legislation and policies to
coordinate and reduce GHG
emission and developing
strategies needed to adapt
to climate change.
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to improve predictions of how climate change will affect smaller
spatial scales.” 81 The preparation by CCSP of twenty-one separate assessment reports prompted Pew Center Director Eileen
Claussen to note that everything is fragmented “so we never
get a clear picture.” 82 Anticipating the extra financial burden on
states, cities, and the general population necessary to regulate
greenhouse emissions, decision makers at all levels are going to
need a clear understanding of potential impacts.83
One recent EPA study highlights the economic impact on
states of anticipating and adapting to climate change. Mundane as it might be, wastewater-collection systems or combined
sewer systems (“CSSs”) are major systems designed to collect
municipal wastewater and storm water runoff. These systems
are prevalent in older cities, particularly in the Midwest, the
Great Lakes, and the eastern United States. These systems can
overflow if they lack adequate capacity to transport the combined volume of municipal wastewater and storm water during
extreme or frequent storm events, resulting in combined sewer
overflow (“CSO”) events. Current regulatory standards allow
for four CSO incidents per year.84 With predicted enhanced precipitation patterns in the Great Lakes, this number of overflow
events is likely to be exceeded. This is important because today
states face the issues of how to strategically invest billions of
dollars into developing more robust and sustainable urban water
and wastewater systems. The answer is clearly related to developing an integrated urban sustainability approach that includes
climate-change scenarios. EPA is currently assessing how such
climate change can impact future urban water and wastewater
systems. This kind of analysis is essential to help decision makers at state and local levels make better decisions. The above
example underscores the impact of climate changes at state
and local levels and highlights the need for a major infusion of
research to better quantify potential impacts and the most appropriate adaptation measures.

International Cooperation and a New United
States-China Partnership
Overcoming historical barriers between developed and
developing countries will require new ways of identifying
those barriers and proposing solutions. The timing may be
right for a U.S.–China initiative targeting specific reductions
of GHG emissions. Such a bilateral agreement would change
the international landscape for climate negotiations.
The negotiations that led to the Framework Convention on
Climate Change in 1992 were tortuous, as the developing nations
blamed the rich nations for the existing problems and demanded
compensation. But in the end an agreement was reached based
on the principle of differential responsibilities among nations:
each country would act according to its own needs but industrial countries would do more than developing ones. The Kyoto
Protocol set binding GHG emission reductions targets for thirtyseven industrialized countries and the European Community.
These targets averaged five percent below 1990 levels over the
five-year period 2008–2012. Arguing that China, India, and
other critical emitters should make firm commitments as well
13

as the more industrialized countries, the United States did not
sign the protocol, contributing to a stalemate that still exists. In
a 2008 policy paper, China reiterated its position that developed
nations have done the most damage to the planet historically
and should therefore bear the most responsibility.85 Recognizing that its reliance on coal for energy makes GHG emission
reductions especially difficult, China argues for the transfer to
developing nations of high-technology equipment for reducing
GHG emissions.
While its economy today is in turmoil, China is expected to
possess the world’s largest economy by 2050, followed by the
EU, the United States, and India.86 As economic forces drive a
good deal of the climate debate, it is clear that the United States
and Chinese economies will shape future international agreements. China already surpasses the United States as the greatest
GHG emitter.87 Since more than fifty percent of global GHG
emissions are produced by the United States, China, and the
EU—with another fifteen percent coming from Russia, India,
and Japan—these countries can effectively determine future
global energy and climate policies.
Although the United States and other industrialized countries bear historic responsibility for existing GHG concentrations, as Joshua Bushy notes, China “will be increasingly
fingered as a climate culprit in the future,” potentially creating a
common interest between the United States and China in avoiding global condemnation as “climate villains. Today’s economic
and environmental stresses present an opportunity for mutually
reinforcing, positive outcomes if the United States and China
help each other tackle immediate environmental problems and
longer-term GHG emissions. A creative U.S.-China energy and
security policy could benefit both countries.” 88
China’s leaders know that their nation’s current path is not
sustainable and are keenly aware of the need to advance science
and technology and to develop a green economy. China recognizes the public health benefits of reducing GHGs and air pollutants (such as sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and fine particles).
Citing data obtained from Chinese officials, Elizabeth Economy
and Kenneth Lieberthal report that environmental degradation
and pollution cost the Chinese economy the equivalent of ten
percent of its GDP annually—as much as US$36 billion from
lack of water to run factories, US$13 billion from the degradation of health impact of acid rain, and US$6 billion from the
spread of desert regions.89
It is also apparent to China’s leaders that the impacts of climate change within China could exacerbate internal political and
social stresses and hence tend to undermine the nation’s political
stability.90 Not only is China in transition from being a developing to becoming a developed nation, but it is also moving from
a centrally directed economy to one strongly driven by market
forces. In the words of Economy and Lieberthal, Chinese officials have the daunting task of shifting “from a planned socialist
economy to an entrepreneurial market economy while maintaining one-party rule.” 91
For the United States, a bilateral agreement with China
could serve to foster other cooperative actions among developed
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and developing nations while helping to avoid potential trade
and other economic conflicts. But if not handled wisely, climate
change could be a source of serious U.S.-China conflict. Joshua
Busby has pointed to relevant strategic issues: “A climate bill
currently before Congress would allow the president, if he or she
deems a country’s climate efforts to be inadequate, to impose
tariff-like fees on carbon-intensive imports such as steel beginning in 2019. Such legislation, if passed, would probably be used
against China, adding to existing frictions over trade, intellectual
property, and the level of China’s currency.” 92
Given the available benefits for both the United States and
China, what strategy would best serve the United States? Jonathan Wiener has recently argued that the United States should
appeal to China’s national interest as the best way forward in
advancing a new partnership.93 Wiener argues that demanding
that China fulfill a perceived moral obligation to limit its GHG
emissions would be ineffective, and that the United States would
be wiser to emphasize China’s own interests—the possibility of
reducing climate change damages to itself and its allies, securing
public health benefits from reducing air pollution, and avoiding
domestic political upheaval that may be associated with extreme
climate events.94
A new U.S.-China partnership should therefore first focus
on actions and new technologies that address a broad range of
gases and pollutants that are both short-lived (days to weeks)
and long-lived (years and decades) in the atmosphere and of gasses that will likely contribute to greenhouse warming. Different
GHGs impact the environment in different manners: for example, the impact of methane on global warming is 62 times the
impact of CO2 and that of nitrous oxide is 116 times that of CO2.
Regulating these gases must therefore be a crucial aspect of any
climate change strategy, especially for China. Based on data in
EPA’s Global Anthropogenic Emissions of Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases report, in 2005, China’s estimated anthropogenic
methane emissions ranked first in the world. Approximately
twenty-five percent of its anthropogenic methane emissions—
209.9 MMTCO2E—come from agriculture (manure management), coal mines, landfills, and natural gas and oil systems.95
China is also the world’s biggest emitter of sulfur dioxide.
According to China’s own data, coal and oil-fired power stations
were responsible for twenty-five million tons sulfide dioxide that
it discharged in 2005, contributing to acid rain that affected a
third of the country.96
Wiener suggests that these considerations point to an
ongoing shift in Chinese climate policy and to the possibility
that an international climate treaty could offer positive incentives to engage China in cooperative action. The United States
thus has an opportunity and an imperative to engage China in
what Wiener describes as “effective action on climate change
through realist persuasion—appeal to global and national
interests, and global and national net benefits.” 97 In political and
environmental terms, a new U.S.–China initiative with objectives of developing and testing new technologies to control a
wide range of pollutants and GHGs could advance new alternate technologies, sharing the economic costs and benefits of a
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new strategy for climate and energy. With both countries poised
to invest hundreds billions in economic recovery, the timing
is right for mutually re-enforcing efforts on promoting green
infrastructure.

Conclusions
Future GHG emission and climate change scenarios are not
optimistic. Global emissions of carbon dioxide grew at a rate
of about 1.4% per year in the 1992 to 2002 time period. Recent
data show an acceleration of emission: 3.3% in the 2000 to 2006
period. China’s major expansion of its coal-fired power generation capacity has been the key factor in this unexpected acceleration in growth rate. Looking ahead it is impossible to have an
effective global mitigation program without a serious commitment by the major economies like the United States and China.
If current emission trends continue at three percent per year
for the next twenty-two years, the projected warming will yield
a best-guess average warming, relative to 1990, of 1.8°C in
2050 and 4.4°C in 2100. Since it is too late to prevent substantial additional warming, the world community has no alternative
other than to pursue both mitigation and adaptation approaches
aggressively.
Effectively pursing a mitigation and adaptation strategy
requires resolution of past climate wars. Fortunately many if
not all of the climate wars of the 2001–2008 period are moving
toward resolution. To be sure, the cost and methods of reducing GHG emissions will continue to raise contentious questions,
especially in the current stage of global financial and economic
distress. However, a positive vision of the future is possible: it
would include enhanced support for technology research and
development, collaboration between government and business,
cooperation among different levels of government, and foreign
policy initiatives that combine environmental concerns and
economic goals to build an innovative and resilient economy.
By taking such actions and ending the climate wars, the United
States can lead the way to protect the world’s environment and
stimulate the global economy.
The author is grateful to Michael MacCracken, Rob Brenner,
Frank Princiotta, Gordon Binder, Jonathan Wiener, and Edward
Fallon for their helpful comments.
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